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When is it legitimate for a government to ‘nudge’ its citizens, in the
sense described by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008)? In their orig-
inal work on the topic, Thaler and Sunstein developed the ‘as judged by
themselves’ (or AJBT) test to answer this question (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008,
5). In a recent paper, L. A. Paul and Sunstein (ms) raised a concern about
this test: it often seems to give the wrong answer in cases in which we are
nudged to make a decision that leads to what Paul calls a personally trans-
formative experience, that is, one that results in our values changing (Paul,
2014). In those cases, the nudgee will judge the nudge to be legitimate after
it has taken place, but only because their values have changed as a result
of the nudge. In this paper, I take up the challenge of finding an alterna-
tive test. I draw on my aggregate utility account of how to choose in the face
of what Edna Ullmann-Margalit (2006) calls big decisions, that is, decisions
that lead to these personally transformative experiences (Pettigrew, 2019,
Chapters 6 and 7).
1 What are nudges?
Sometimes, your life doesn’t go as well as it might because of decisions that
you make. You eat unhealthily and get sick; you don’t save for your retire-
ment and live in straitened circumstances in your old age; you don’t get
vaccinated against a dangerous disease and you catch it. Paternalists hold
that it is legitimate for governments to intervene to improve your life by en-
suring that you don’t make such choices. Sometimes, those interventions
involve either removing the bad choice or making it extremely onerous to
make it. The government might place very high taxes on unhealthy foods,
or perhaps ban them outright; they might introduce a mandatory pension
scheme to which all employees must contribute; they might require you to
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be vaccinated against various diseases before you can participate in certain
aspects of civic life. The libertarian is horrified. Such restrictions on free-
dom of choice and autonomy are anathema to them, and well beyond the
legitimate reach of government. However, according to some paternalists,
there are types of intervention that are likely to improve the lives of those
they affect while being perfectly compatible with libertarianism. Enter the
nudge theorists, or libertarian paternalists (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, 2008).
According to them, a government can improve its subjects’ lives in some
of the ways that the paternalist would like it to, but without restricting the
freedom of choice that those subjects enjoy and without trespassing on their
autonomy.
How? There are three claims that are central to the libertarian paternal-
ist’s strategy. First: in many of those cases in which your life goes poorly
because of decisions you make, the option you choose is not the best means
to your ends. Your end is living the longest and healthiest life that your
particular body will afford you, yet you don’t choose the foods that are the
best means to that end; your end is a good quality of life at all stages of
your life, yet you don’t save for retirement; your end is a healthy life in
the immediate future, yet you choose not to get vaccinated against certain
common illnesses.
Second: sometimes when you choose these suboptimal means, you do
so because of certain cognitive mechanisms that we all share: perhaps ad-
diction, perhaps a drive towards immediate gratification, perhaps an in-
ability to reason well with probabilities, perhaps a sort of inertia that makes
it difficult for us to abandon the status quo even when there is an option
available that we prefer. These mechanisms disrupt our rational decision
making in some way and lead us to irrational choices that are poor means
to our ends.
The third claim that is central to the libertarian paternalist’s strategy:
in those cases in which certain cognitive mechanisms disrupt our rational
decision making and lead us to choose poor means to our ends, there are
ways in which the decision might have been presented to us that would
lead us to choose the best means. These ways of presenting the choice are
called ‘nudges’. When we are nudged in these ways, we will most likely
choose the best means to our ends, but we might not choose those because
they are the best. Indeed, we might end up choosing them for rather poor
reasons. For instance, as we’ll see below, we might choose to eat a healthy
snack simply because it was listed first among the options. But so long
as we do choose it, we will have chosen a better means to our ends, and
our lives will likely be improved. What’s more, since all that the nudge
changed was the way in which the decision was presented and not the
set of options that were available, the libertarian should be satisfied that
freedom of choice, liberty, and autonomy were preserved.
Let’s illustrate the strategy with an example. As I’ve mentioned, many
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people have the goal of living as long and as healthy a life as their par-
ticular body will allow them. They also know that eating certain foods is
a good means to that end, while eating others is not. Nonetheless, when
standing in the queue at the cafeteria and faced with a choice between the
good means and the bad means, people with this end often choose the bad
means. Let’s suppose that you are a civil servant charged with designing
the menu for the cafeteria in some state-run institution, such as a museum.
You read the ‘first is best’ study by social psychologists Dana Carney and
Mahzarin Banaji. Here’s an excerpt from the abstract of that study:
We experience the world serially rather than simultaneously. A
century of research on human and nonhuman animals has sug-
gested that the first experience in a series of two or more is cog-
nitively privileged. We report three experiments designed to
test the effect of first position on implicit preference and choice
using targets that range from individual humans and social groups
to consumer goods. Experiment 1 demonstrated an implicit
preference to buy goods from the first salesperson encountered
and to join teams encountered first, even when the difference
in encounter is mere seconds. In Experiment 2 the first of two
consumer items presented in quick succession was more likely
to be chosen. (Carney & Banaji, 2012)
What’s more, worried about what you’ve heard of the replication crisis in
social psychology in general and priming research in particular, you look
further into this study and find that it seems to replicate. As a result, when
you design your menu, you list the healthier options at the top and the less
healthy further down. In this way, you hope to sway customers back from
the temptation they feel to choose the unhealthy option, which is the poorer
means to their end of a long and healthy life, and towards the healthy op-
tion. The libertarian is happy because you have not removed any options,
but merely presented them in a particular way, and you have not made any
of them too onerous to choose. And the paternalist is happy because you
have improved the life of the chooser.
Indeed, note something further: you have improved the life of the chooser
by their own lights. After all, we specified that the chooser has the goal of
a long and healthy life. So the nudge you have performed is acceptable to
the means paternalist as well as the ends paternalist. According to the means
paternalist, it is legitimate for governments to intervene to make it more
likely that citizens will make choices that are better means to the ends they
already have; according to the ends paternalist, it is also legitimate to in-
tervene to make it more likely that citizens will make choices that are bet-
ter means to certain ends that the government takes to be better than the
ends the citizens actually have. Nudges can, of course, be used in the ser-
vice of either form of paternalism. According to the ends paternalist, if the
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civil servant thinks that few people actually have the goal of a longer and
healthier life, but believes that this goal is better than those they actually
have, they might appeal to Carney and Banaji’s research to nudge people
towards healthier eating. However, Thaler and Sunstein are, for the most
part, means paternalists, and the test they propose to gauge the legitimacy
of a nudge is intended to test whether the nudge is legitimate from that
point of view.
2 The ‘as judged by themselves’ test
We’ve met nudges now, and we’ve noted that their enthusiasts are often
means paternalists. Let’s now meet the test that Thaler and Sunstein sug-
gest we use to identify when a nudge is acceptable to the means paternalist
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Sunstein, 2018). As Paul and Sunstein present it:
The [‘as judged by themselves’ or] AJBT criterion, as we shall
call it, asks whether those who have been nudged ex ante—for
example, with a warning or a reminder—deem themselves to
be better off ex post as a result. (Paul & Sunstein, ms, 2)
And here is my paraphrase: a nudge is legitimate if the nudgee would
assent to it if asked in a certain idealized situation. What is the idealized
situation? It takes place after the nudge has happened; the nudgee is given
as much time as they need to reflect on the choice; their irrational cognitive
mechanisms, such as status quo bias, temptation, etc. are removed; they
are provided with all the evidence relevant to the choice; any cognitive
limitations, such as limitations in their logical or statistical reasoning, are
removed; and they are equipped with unlimited cognitive resources, such
as computing time and power, with which to assess the evidence. This is
Thaler and Sunstein’s ‘as judged by themselves’ test.
One distinctive feature of this test is that it is hypothetical. It does not
require that the nudgee is actually asked the question in the idealized cir-
cumstances just described. All that is required is that they would give a
particular answer were they asked it in the those circumstances. After all,
we have no way to endow someone with unlimited cognitive facilities; no
way to remove all of their cognitive biases; and so on.
Another distinctive feature is that it involves some normative notions—
it talks of irrational cognitive mechanisms and cognitive limitations. In or-
der to administer the test in many cases, you will have to settle some con-
troversial normative questions. After all, there is widespread disagreement
among economists, philosophers, and psychologists about what count as
an irrational cognitive mechanism. Is it irrational to be risk-averse in such
a way that you have the Allais preferences when faced with those choices
(Allais, 1953)? Is it irrational to be ambiguity averse so that you have the
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Ellsberg preferences when faced with those choices (Ellsberg, 1961)? Is it
irrational to discount your future selves (Frederick et al., 2002)? If some
ways of discounting are rational, which are they? Is it irrational to deviate
from the Principle of Indifference when setting your prior probabilities? To
each of these questions, there is a reasonable number of incompatible an-
swers each of which is defended by a substantial group of theorists. And
for each, there is some nudge that passes Thaler and Sunstein’s test when
you give one of these answers, but not when you give another.
Let’s see this play out in a standard example (Lecouteux, 2015). Sup-
pose I nudge you to make greater contributions to your pension scheme
now. You can continue to contribute £140 each month, or your can increase
it to £200. Left to your own devices, you are going to choose the status quo;
I nudge you to switch to the higher contribution. Is this nudge legitimate?
Well, according to Thaler and Sunstein, that depends on whether you’d as-
sent to it in the idealized situation described above. And that will depend
on whether, in this idealized situation, you discount the future, and if so, by
how much. And that, in its turn, depends on whether discounting the fu-
ture, or discounting it to the extent you in fact do, is an irrational cognitive
mechanism. Suppose you discount the future quite dramatically, and that’s
why you wish to stick with your current contribution. While the extra £60
will bring you less happiness now, when you are reasonably well off, than
it would when you have retired, when you will be much less well off, you
discount that future retired self so much that it compensates for this extra
happiness. Some will take this dramatic discounting to be irrational, and
will expunge it when they move you to the idealized situation in which
Thaler and Sunstein’s test is administered. Others will not. This leaves us
with a question: which theory of rational choice should be used when we
apply Thaler and Sunstein’s ‘as judged by themselves’ test? The nudger’s
or the nudgee’s? The means paternalist is happy to override the means we
take to our ends, but not to override the ends themselves. What about our
theory of which is the best means to our ends? Are they happy to override
that? We’ll return to this question below.1
One final point about Thaler and Sunstein’s test before we move on
the objection to it raised by L. A. Paul and Cass Sunstein. Some object to
nudges on the grounds that many of us value making our choices for our-
selves, even if we end up making them poorly as a result. I want to be the
author of my own life, they might say, and that includes being the author
1While preparing this paper, I was fortunate enough to attend a workshop in which
Michael Chobli discussed the fascinating question of what John Rawls, and indeed liberals
in general, should say when different members of a society have different accounts of the
demands of rational choice: should they find a way to respect that pluralism, just as they
respect pluralism about conceptions of the good? Or should they try to impose what they
take to be the correct account of rational choice? Since libertarian paternalists are most often
liberals, this question is closely related to the question I raise here.
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of any mistakes I make. I’d rather choose entirely myself and choose badly
than choose under the influence of a nudge and choose well. But Thaler
and Sunstein’s test can accommodate this. The key lies in the question that
we ask the nudgee in the idealised hypothetical situation after the nudge
has taken place. If we ask them only whether they are glad that they made
the choice that they did, we might end up thinking it legitimate to nudge
someone even when they don’t want to be nudged. After all, such a person
will nonetheless be glad they made the choice they did, for it has better served
their ends. But they will not be glad they made the choice they did because
they were nudged, for they wish to be the author of their own life. So, in or-
der to ensure we don’t nudge the unwilling, we must ask them afterwards
whether they are glad they were nudged to make the choice they did, not
only whether they are glad they made the choice they did.
3 Paul and Sunstein on the test
In this section, I turn to a different concern about Thaler and Sunstein’s test.
Start by noting that the test is administered—or, better, it is hypothetically
administered—after the nudge has taken place. As Paul & Sunstein (ms)
put it above, we ask whether the nudgee “deems themselves to be better
off ex post as a result [of the nudge]”. But, as a number of philosophers,
economists, psychologists have noted, our values change across time, and
sometimes as a result of choices that we make.2
Perhaps the most widely discussed example in the philosophical litera-
ture is the decision to become a parent.
Happy Parent I am currently child-free, and I am deciding
whether or not to adopt. At the moment, I value remaining
child-free more than I value adopting a child and becoming a
parent. When I look forward to the two possible futures ahead
of me, one in which I am a parent and one in which I am child-
free, I value the latter more. I value the things I will be free to do
in that possible future: the time it will allow me to strengthen
and deepen the bonds with my friends; the volunteering oppor-
tunities it will afford me the time to pursue; the extra money I’ll
have available that I can use to pursue the projects I love and
donate to the causes that matter to me; and so on. However,
I’ve spoken to enough parents to know that, were I to adopt,
these preferences are likely to reverse. I will likely form a bond
with my adopted child so strong that I will prefer the life in
which I care for them to the one in which they are not in my
life.
2Some representative pieces from the philosophical literature: (Parfit, 1984; Ullmann-
Margalit, 2006; Bykvist, 2006; Paul, 2014).
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And there are other cases as well. Should I emigrate to another country,
where the dominant values are different from those in my home country,
there is evidence that I will likely change my values to better match those
of my new surroundings, at least to some extent (Bardi et al., 2014).
So now imagine that the government were to nudge me towards aban-
doning my currently preferred child-free life. And suppose they were to
succeed: I adopt and become a parent. From the moment my adopted child
comes to live with me, my values change in exactly the way I predicted. At
this point, ex post, we administer Thaler and Sunstein’s test. Am I glad I
was nudged? Yes! Of course I am! For I currently prefer the life I have to
the alternative in which I remained child-free. So the nudge passes the test:
it’s deemed legitimate. And yet this seems the wrong verdict. It does not
seem a legitimate nudge. Not only has the government nudged me to take
a means to an end I don’t have; but they’ve done so knowing that, by doing
this, I will change my ends as well. The means paternalist is horrified.
4 A natural tweak?
A natural first reaction to this problem is to think that it admits of a straight-
forward solution. Surely there is an simple tweak to Thaler and Sunstein’s
test that will allow it to cope with these cases. Instead of administering the
hypothetical test only after the nudge, we administer it both before and af-
ter. A nudge is then deemed legitimate if the nudgee would be happy with
it when asked under idealized conditions at both times. Since it seems that
I would not be happy with being nudged to adopt when asked before the
nudge, that nudge is not legitimate, just as we suspected.
Now, you might worry that Thaler and Sunstein’s test must be adminis-
tered only after the nudge has taken place because nudges often only work
if the nudgee is not aware they’re being nudged. If you’re told that an op-
tion has been placed at the top of the list because the person who made
the list wants you to choose it, your contrarian side might kick in and you
might be minded to thwart their attempt by choosing something else, or
you might simply randomise so as not to feel a dupe. But remember that,
as we noted above, the test is purely hypothetical—we do not in fact ad-
minister it. Rather, the nudger asks themselves what the nudgee would
say were they to be asked in the idealized circumstances Thaler and Sun-
stein describe. So there is no concern about the test interfering with the
efficacy of the nudge.
5 Harman’s ‘I’ll be glad I did it reasoning’
Nonetheless, there is a problem. To see it, it’s helpful to note that Thaler
and Sunstein’s original test is essentially a third-person version of the form
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of reasoning that Elizabeth Harman calls ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning
(Harman, 2009). I find myself on my sofa on a cold winter’s night; I haven’t
really moved all day, and I’ve got a cup of steaming hot tea and the book
I’m enjoying near at hand. Despite this enviable position, and despite the
fact I’d currently prefer to stay on the couch, I decide to go for a run. Why?
When asked, I justify my choice by saying: If I go for a run, I’ll be glad I did
it.
As Harman points out, this might seem reasonable in the case just de-
scribed, but it is not good reasoning in general. Here’s an example I have
given in which it goes wrong; it is close to one of Harman’s original exam-
ples (Pettigrew, 2019, Chapter 15):
Deborah’s pregnancy Deborah has decided to have a baby, but
she needs to decide when to try to become pregnant: now, or in
three months’ time. Currently, she has a virus, and she knows
that, when people become pregnant whilst carrying this virus,
their child will have an extremely high chance of developing
a very aggressive cancer around the age of forty. However, if
she becomes pregnant in three months’ time, once her body is
rid of the virus, there will be no risk to her child. Currently,
she values having the child with the prospect of aggressive can-
cer very much less than she values having the child without.
However, if she becomes pregnant now and has a child with
that prospect, she will, most likely, form a bond with them so
strong that she would value having that particular child, with
their tragic prognosis, more than having any other child, in-
cluding the child without that prognosis that she would have
had if she had waited three months. After all, the alternative
child would have been a different child, created from different
gametes; they would not be the child with whom Deborah has
formed the bond. So, if Deborah becomes pregnant now, she’ll
be glad she did it. Nonetheless, that seems like a bad reason to
do so.
Thaler and Sunstein’s test essentially says this: a nudge is legitimate if the
nudgee would be glad the nudger did it. And many of the nudges that it
incorrectly judges as legitimate are ones that lead to decisions we might try
but fail to justify using ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning. For instance, it says
it would be legitimate to nudge Deborah to become pregnant now rather
than in three months.
Now, just as we tried tweaking Thaler and Sunstein’s test to overcome
these problems in the case of nudges, so we might think we can overcome
analogous problems here by amending ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning in
the same way. The fact you’ll be glad you did something is not, on its own,
a good reason to do it; however, we might think that, combined with the
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fact that you currently want to do it, it is. Again, we suggest that, instead
of only asking whether it’s what you prefer after the decision, we ask both
before and afterwards.
Nonetheless, this tweak still fails. Consider the following sort of case
(Bykvist, 2006; Pettigrew, 2019):
Unhappy Parent I am currently child-free, and I am deciding
whether or not to adopt. At the moment, I greatly value the
prospective future life in which I am a parent. I also greatly
value the future life in which I remain child-free, but I value
that slightly less. If I remain child-free, I’ll retain these values.
If I become a parent, I will come to assign a pretty low value
to the life of a parent, but I’ll assign even lower value to the
alternative life in which I’m child-free. Becoming a parent will
lower the value I assign to my life more generally, but I will
retain the view that this life with a child is more valuable than
it would be without.
In this case, it seems, I’ll want to become a parent before I do, and I’ll be
glad I did it afterwards; and indeed, if I remain child-free, I’ll regret that,
because I’ll at that time still prefer the life of a parent. If I am nudged into
becoming a parent, I’ll be happy with this should I be asked in the idealised
situation both before the decision and afterwards. So the nudge counts as
legitimate according to the tweaked version of Thaler and Sunstein’s test
that I described in the previous section. Yet it seems I don’t have good
reason to become a parent in this case; and it seems illegitimate to nudge
me towards that life. It would surely be better for me to remain child-free
and live with the slight regret that results from living a life that I slightly
disprefer to an alternative I might have lived; better than live a life I would
value very little were I to live it.
If this is right, even the tweaked version of Thaler and Sunstein’s test
fails. How, then should we test the legitimacy of a nudge?
6 Choosing for changing selves
In fact, I think the tweaked version of Thaler and Sunstein’s test is on the
right track. But, in the apparent counterexamples I have given, I have ap-
plied it in the wrong way. When I’ve applied it in the cases I’ve described so
far in this paper, I’ve answered the question whether the individual would
be happy with the nudge at a particular time by looking to what I have
called elsewhere their local utilities at that time (Pettigrew, 2019, 18). These
are the utilities that encode their values at that time. So, in Unhappy Par-
ent, the local utility I assign to being a parent before becoming one is very
high, while the local utility I assign to remaining child-free is still high, but
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slightly lower; and so on. However, as I’ve argued elsewhere, you should
not use your local utilities when you make a choice at a particular time
(Pettigrew, 2019, Chapters 6 and 7). Rather, those local utilities constitute
just one factor that goes into determining what I call your global utilities at
that time, and these are the ones you should use to make your decisions.
The other factors that determine your global utilities at a time are your local
utilities at other times in your life.
The argument runs as follows. When you make a decision at a partic-
ular time, your current self at that time makes the decision on behalf of all
the selves that make up the person you are—your past, present, and future
selves. Because of this, the utilities you use to make the decision should be
the result of aggregating the local utilities of each of those selves. Figur-
ing out how you should aggregate these local utilities to give your global,
decision-making utilities at a particular time is akin to figuring out how
a state should choose on behalf of a citizenry with a wide variety of val-
ues, or how the head of an activist collective should choose on behalf of its
membership, many of whom have differing ends. It is the central problem
of social choice theory.3
The aggregation method for which I argued runs as follows. Let’s rep-
resent a possible outcome of a choice you make as an entire possible history
of the world, which includes: (a) the fixed history up to the moment of the
choice and specifies, at each point at which you exist in that history, the lo-
cal utility that encodes the extent to which you, at that point of time, value
the whole history, and (b) the future development of the world that again
specifies, at each point at which you exist, your local utility at that point for
the whole history. We must then aggregate the various local utilities that
you assign to this outcome at the various points at which you exist within
it to give your current global utility for that outcome, which you’ll use to
make decisions now. And we do that by assigning a weight to each of your
selves that exist in this history based on certain considerations, weight their
utility by that, and then sum up those weighted utilities.
How are we to assign the weights? There are various considerations.
3Of course, when I tell you that, in order to solve the problem of rational choice for
change selves I must solve the central problem of social choice theory, you might immedi-
ately respond that various impossibility theorems from Arrow’s onwards show that there
will be no satisfactory solution (Arrow, 1951; Gaertner, 2009). In fact, as I argue, this isn’t
quite true for the particular case that is our focus here (Pettigrew, 2019, Sections 6.3 and
7.3). For one thing, we assume cardinal utilities, and so Arrow’s theorem itself does not
apply. The results that come closest to threatening my proposal are due to Philippe Mon-
gin (1995) and Matthias Hild (2001). However, I argue that these in fact do not cause any
problems. Mongin’s does not apply because we aggregate the local utilities of the various
selves to give the decision-making utility, but we don’t aggregate the credences of the var-
ious selves to give the decision-making probabilities—we just use our current credences.
And Hild’s does not apply because there is a privileged level of grain at which we describe
the outcomes.
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Some of them impose genuine obligations to assign weights in a particular
range; some impose no obligations but are the sorts of considerations that
we might adduce to justify the weights that we do assign.
So, for instance, the fact that the other selves form part of the same
person as your current self, and the fact that you are choosing on behalf
of that person and not just your current self, creates a defeasible obligation
to assign at least some weight to the local utilities of each other self. What
might defeat this obligation? If one of the selves that belongs to the person
you are has local utilities that you take to be morally abhorrent, that would
defeat your obligation to give them any weight at all. If my past self valued
eating meat, while my current self finds that morally beyond the pale, I
need not give that past self’s local utilities any weight.
As well as the general defeasible obligation to give each self at least
some weight, there are further, more specific obligations to give particular
selves greater weight. For instance, if a past self has made a sacrifice from
which your current self benefits, you might have an obligation to give that
past self some significant weight. Or, if your current decision will dispro-
portionately affect certain future selves, you might have an obligation to
give those significant weight.
And then there are considerations that do not create obligations. For
instance, we often assign greater weight to selves in whom we recognise
ourself more or with whom we anticipate a greater degree of psychological
connectedness (Parfit, 1984, 313). So I might give low weight to a future self
who is a parent because I find them and their values alien to my current
way of thinking. But there is no obligation to do this. It’s also open to
me, once I have given weight in accordance with the obligations described
in the previous two paragraphs, to then divide the weights as equally as
possible among all selves.
This overview is inevitably a little brief, but it sketches some of the cen-
tral theses of my account of how an individual should choose when the
selves that constitute them have different values. They should use their
global utilities at the time of the choice, which are weighted averages of the
local utilities that encode the values of those different selves. My proposal
here is that it is also these global utilities, and not the local utilities that
partly determine them, to which we should appeal when we administer
the tweaked version of Thaler and Sunstein’s test. That is, when we ask
the nudgee before and after the nudge whether they are glad of it, we are
asking whether it is a better means to the ends encoded in their global util-
ities than the choice they would otherwise have made; we are not asking
whether it is a better means to the ends encoded in their local utilities.
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7 The new ‘as judged by themselves’ test at work
To see how this would work, let’s apply it to two of the examples we’ve
described above. My description of these is idealized in certain ways in
order to make the fundamental idea most apparent.
First, Happy Parent. To simplify greatly, we suppose that, if I apply to
adopt, I’ll be successful. So there are two available options: Adopt, Don’t
Adopt. And there are two possible outcomes: Become a parent, which is sure
to happen should I choose Adopt; and Remain child-free, which is sure to
happen should I choose Don’t Adopt. Throughout my life up to the decision
point, I have valued the child-free life a great deal, and a little more than the
parental life. If I remain child-free, I’ll retain those values. If, on the other
hand, I become a parent, I’ll value the parental life enormously, and the
child-free life a lot less. To help us think this through, we might put some
numbers on these values—that is, we might measure them numerically as
local utilities as follows:
Child-free Parent
Before 12 8
After & Adopt 4 128
After & Don’t Adopt 12 8
Now let’s aggregate these local utilities to give my global utilities for the
two possible outcomes, Parent and Child-free. To do this, for each outcome,
I need to assign weights to the various selves that make up the person that
is me in that possible history; and I need to do this from the point of view
of my current self. Let’s look first at the outcome Parent in which I adopt
a child. I consider my local utilities both now and after becoming a parent
to be morally acceptable, so I’m obliged to give at least some weight to
both current and future selves. But how much weight to each? Here, my
obligations end and I am permitted to do a number of things. For instance,
just as many think it’s legitimate in our interactions with other people to
give more weight to ourselves and our nearest and dearest, so it’s legitimate
for my current self to give more weight to itself than to my future self. And,
in particular, my current self might assign quite a lot more weight to itself
than to my future self because, since the values of my future self are so
dramatically different from those of my current self, my current self does
not fully recognise themselves in that future self. Let’s suppose my current
self actually assigns three times as much weight to itself as to my future
self.4 In this case, we have the following global utility for the outcome
4We assume here that weights always sum to 1. In the cases we will consider, in which
each possible history contains the same number of selves, this is an innocent assumption.
But when different histories contain different numbers of selves, it becomes a strong and
possibly implausible assumption for the same reason that average utilitarianism is implau-
sible. Since it won’t affect the points I wish to make here, I’ll leave the assumption in place.
I thank Adrianno Mannino for emphasising the connection with population ethics here.
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Parent in which I adopt a child:
Global Utility in Parent before adopting =
(weight for current self × current self’s local utility for Parent)+












And, since your values in the outcome Child-free don’t change through-
out the history that represents that outcome, whatever weights you assign,
your global utility for that outcome is:
Global Utility in Child-free before adopting =
(weight for current self × current self’s local utility for Child-free)+
(weight for future self × future self’s local utility for Child-free) = 12
So, although your current local utility for becoming a parent is lower than
your current local utility for remaining child-free, your global utilities at
the earlier time, which incorporates the local utilities of your current and
future selves, are ordered the other way around. That is:
Global Utility in Parent before adopting >
Global Utility in Child-free before adopting
What’s more, at the later time, after the decision is made, if you chose to be
a parent then, providing you will give more weight to your current self at
that time than to your past self, then:
Global Utility in Parent after adopting >
Global Utility in Child-free after adopting
In this case, then, it would be legitimate for the government to nudge me
to adopt. After all, when we look at my global, decision-making utilities
before and after the nudge, I’d be glad of the nudge.
On the other hand, here is the situation described in Unhappy Parent,
with some indicative numbers used:
Child-free Parent
Before 120 128
After & Adopt 8 12
After & Don’t Adopt 120 128
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Then, using the same weights that we used above:
Global Utility in Parent before adopting =
(weight for current self × current self’s local utility for Parent)+












And, since your values in the outcome Child-free don’t change throughout
the history represents that outcome, your global utilithy for that is
Global Utility in Child-free before adopting =
(weight for current self × current self’s local utility for Child-free)+
(weight for future self × future self’s local utility for Child-free) = 120
So, in this case,
Global Utility in Parent before adopting <
Global Utility in Child-free before adopting
And if the government nudges me to adopt in the Unhappy Parent sce-
nario, the tweaked version of Thaler and Sunstein’s test that I propose
deems it illegitimate, just as we would like.
So this is our proposed test: a nudge is legitimate if the nudgee’s global
utilities before the nudge lead to preferences that favour it and the nudgee’s
global utilities after the nudge do likewise.
8 The problem of the weights
Now, at first sight, this might seem a rather different sort of test from the
one that Thaler and Sunstein describe. Mine talks of actual global utilities,
which I take to represent actual internal mental states, even if somewhat
idealised, while theirs talks of choices in idealised hypothetical situations,
which are hypothetical external behaviours. But in fact I think both seek to
pinpoint the same thing. I take it that Thaler and Sunstein assume that, in
the hypothetical situation they describe, what you choose is what it would
be rational for you to choose given your true preferences, your true util-
ities, your true credences, your true attitudes to risk, and so on.5 If not,
5Infante et al. (2016) agree with this interpretation of Thaler and Sunstein’s intention—
what I am calling the true preferences, utilities, credences, and atittudes to risk, Infante, et
al. call the attitudes of the “inner rational agent”. They raise worries about the psychologi-
cal reality that this picture assumes. I don’t.
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why move to this hypothetical scenario? As I noted above, one of the cen-
tral tenets of nudge theory is that some of our cognitive mechanisms and
limitations lead us to choose suboptimal means to our ends. As a result,
nudge theorists hold that looking to our actual choices won’t reveal our
true preferences or our true utilities in the way that economists have some-
times assumed. Instead we must look to our hypothetical choices in the
idealized situation in which these cognitive mechanisms and limitations
are removed. In those situations, our true utilities are revealed. After all,
when nudge theorists say that we often take suboptimal means to our ends,
they are thereby assuming that we have ends, even if they are sometimes
obscured by our cognitive mechanisms and limitations. And it is these
ends that are encoded in our local utilities and then aggregated to give our
global utilities.
Nonetheless, it is true that my version of Thaler and Sunstein’s test re-
quires something more than merely our ends, which are encoded in our
local utilities. It also requires the weights we apply to these local utilities
when we generate the global, decision-making utilities to which we appeal
in the revised version of the test. This raises two problems: first, these
weights are often much more difficult to discover than the local utilities;
second, often, the nudgee does not set these weights in advance of mak-
ing the decision for which they are required. Let’s treat these two issues in
order.
8.1 Unknown weights
First, suppose I have set the weights I will apply to my own local utilities
and to those of the other selves in the collective that makes up the person
I am. How might you, as a prospective nudger keen to figure out whether
your nudge would be legitimate, go about discovering these? There seem
to be (at least) four sources of information on which you might draw: my
testimony and my past choice behaviour; and the testimony and choice
behaviour of others. We talk about the weights we’ll assign to our future
and past selves less often than we talk about our values, goals, and ends,
but we aren’t completely silent about them. For instance, by listening to the
testimony of others and observing the choices they make, you might note
that some people assign lower weight to future selves the less they identify
with them. Bearing this in mind, and observing my past choices, you might
notice a close relationship between how much I say I identify with a future
self and the weights I must be assigning to them in order to justify the
choices I make. So, if I say before adoption that I simply don’t recognise
myself in the person I think I’ll become after adopting, that’s good evidence
that I’m going to assign them very low weight. So, while it might require
greater effort to gather the sort of evidence we need to discover that most
people assign less weight to future selves with whom they identify less
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than to gather the evidence we need to discover that most people value
lives more the longer and healthier they are, it is nonetheless possible.
It’s worth noting again before we move on that this is no purely the-
oretical puzzle. As we’ve already seen, governments will have to know
the weights that individuals assign to their future selves in order to assess
the legitimacy of some of the most standard nudges. After all, whether or
not it is legitimate to nudge someone to contribute more to their pension
depends in part on the extent to which they discount the utilities of their
future selves. And that is essentially the question of how much weight they
assign to those future selves.
8.2 Undetermined weights
Let’s now turn to the second problem: sometimes the weights my current
self assigns to past, present, and future selves’ local utilities to give my cur-
rent global utilities just don’t exist yet; sometimes, I just haven’t set these
weights. In such a case, is it legitimate to nudge me in one direction or
another?
In fact, once again, this question arises in the case of the nudge towards
pension contributions, since many people simply haven’t thought carefully
about the extent to which they discount the future and therefore haven’t
set their discount rate. So the question arises: in such a case, is it legit-
imate to nudge them? Indeed, this may well be the situation for many
nudges. It’s notable that, in Carney and Banaji’s ‘first is best’ study from
above, it is when individuals have no strong prior preferences between the
options—the salesperson from whom they buy or the candidate for whom
they vote—that they choose the first they encounter. So, if a nudging strat-
egy that appeals to the ‘first is best’ results turns out to be effective, that
suggests that the individual has no strong preferences prior to the nudge,
and that might be because they have considered the outcomes and settled
on roughly equal utilities for each, or it might be because they have not
considered the outcomes and so haven’t yet set their utilities for them.
So: is it legitimate to nudge someone into a choice when they do not
have set preferences between the options, either because they have not set
their local utilities in the options or because they have not set the weights
they will apply to those local utilities to give the global utilities they will
use for decision-making?
The first and rather predictably philosophical thing to say is that it de-
pends. It depends on what sort of paternalist you are; and indeed thinking
about these sorts of cases leads us to draw further distinctions between dif-
ferent varieties of paternalisms. An ends paternalist clearly thinks that it is
sometimes legitimate to do this, since they think it’s legitimate for the gov-
ernment to nudge you towards a choice that is the optimal means to some
ends other than your own and a suboptimal means to your own ends. But
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what of the means paternalist, which is the brand of paternalism most often
associated with nudge theory? Here, I think there are at least two camps.
There are those who think it is only reasonable to intervene to make it more
likely someone chooses a better means to ends to which they are currently
committed. We might call these means-to-existing-ends paternalists. And there
are those who think it’s legitimate to intervene to secure the best means
to an end that the intervener determines themselves, but only when the target of
the intervention has no current commitments either way regarding that end. We
might call these means-to-unset-ends paternalists. And indeed, you might di-
vide the second view into two further positions. On the one hand, there
are the means-to-unset-but-determined-ends paternalists, who say that it’s le-
gitimate to intervene to influence a choice even when the individual has
not set their utilities in a particular way, providing the individual would set
them in a particular way were they given the chance to do so, and your in-
tervention points them towards the best means to those ends they would
have. On the other hand, there are the means-to-unset-and-undetermined-ends
paternalists, who says that this is not necessary.
To which of these positions should the nudge theorist or libertarian pa-
ternalist subscribe? I’m not sure this question admits of a determinate an-
swer, since there are many different nudge theorists and the commitments
they all share might not determine a single answer. But let me consider a
couple of the options.
First, consider the means-to-unset-and-undetermined-ends paternalists. And
think again of the example of Happy Parent. I’m child-free, and I currently
prefer that; I’ll retain that preference if I remain child-free; but I’ll come
to vastly prefer being a parent if I choose to do that. My global, decision-
making utilities for the two options at the point of decision depend on the
weights I assign to my current and future selves. But let’s suppose I haven’t
set them. So, at the moment, I have local utilities but no global utilities. If I
were given the chance to set these weights and thereby set my global utili-
ties, I’d do so in a way that favours remaining child-free. Is it legitimate for
the government to nudge me in the opposite direction, that is, to become a
parent?
A natural answer is that it is not, but for reasons we more often associate
with liberalism in general rather than means paternalism specifically. After
all, liberalism requires that the government not trespass on my autonomy
(unless by exercising my autonomy I trespass on someone else’s). And on
many accounts of autonomy, what is important is that I am the only one
who chooses the way I want to live my life, and that includes the ends
that I have and pursue during that life (Raz, 1988; Colburn, 2010). If the
government nudges me to become a parent when that is not the option to
which I was committed to assigning a higher global utility beforehand, and
if by becoming a parent, I come to consider being a parent to be one of my
ends, it was to some extent the government and not me who was the author
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of my ends.
Of course, as is often pointed out, most contemporary liberals recognise
that, pace Kant, we cannot hope to be the sole author of our ends. Even if
we explicitly choose some of our ends, we do so from the starting point of
other, perhaps second-order, ends that we have. And there must be some
point at which the ends on which we base our choice of other ends are
not chosen and come from outside ourselves—from the society we live in,
the media we consume, the family we grow up in, the group of friends or
colleagues with whom we share so much of our lives, and so on. Many
liberals react to this by saying that it is not necessary for our autonomy that
we should be the sole author of all of our ends; instead, what is required is
that we endorse the ends we have when we reflect upon them and upon the
way they were formed (Dworkin, 1976, 1988). But if that is our criterion,
then nudging me to become a parent does not trespass on my autonomy.
For afterwards and upon reflection, I do endorse the ends that I have come
to have as a result of the choice I was nudged to make.
So, if means-to-unset-and-undetermined-ends paternalism is wrong, it
isn’t because it trespasses on autonomy. But it seems wrong nonetheless.
I think a better reason to reject it is the threat of governmental overreach.
That is, the problem is not that I was not the sole author of the ends I came
to have after the nudge; the problem is that the other actor responsible for
those ends was specifically the government. If nudges of the sort we are
considering were legitimate, they would provide governments with a le-
gitimate means by which to shape the ends of their citizens. And this, both
liberal and libertarian agree, is beyond the pale. Such nudges are wrong for
exactly the reason that government-mandated party political propaganda
in schools would be wrong. In both cases, the government abuses its power
to shape the preferences of its citizens.
Does the government also abuse its power if it nudges you towards the
best means to the ends that you would set if you were to consider them?
In other words, does the objection just raised against means-to-unset-and-
undetermined-ends paternalism also tell against means-to-unset-but-determined-
ends paternalism? I would say not. Requiring that this counterfactual is
true puts a strong limitation on government overreach. They cannot shape
the preferences of citizens in ways the citizens themselves would not shape
those preferences themselves.
Nonetheless, you might think that there is a problem here. It lies in the
sort of evidence that the government might gather to justify such a nudge.
It will almost certainly be statistical. It will most likely pick out certain
features you have, and then note that among people with those features,
almost everyone who has considered their ends has the ends that the gov-
ernment will assume you would have were you to consider them. I think
some might object to this on the grounds that it treats us not as free individ-
uals who freely choose our ends, but as people whose ends are determined
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by certain of their features.
I don’t find this objection compelling myself. Were the sort of regularity
in question observed, it simply would suggest that people with the features
in question do tend to choose them in a particular way. And that suggests
it will be true of you as well. But it says nothing about why. I do not deny
your autonomy if I assume of you, based on my experience of other people,
that, if you are presented with the choice between an hour of pleasure and
an hour of pain, you’ll choose the pleasure. You and everyone else I’ve
observed has been perfectly free to choose either option. But observing
that nearly everyone chooses the pleasure gives me very strong reason to
think that you will as well. Sometimes there are simply good reasons to do
one thing rather than another, and in those cases, many people will do that
thing; but this does not mean that they were not free to do otherwise.
9 Disagreements about rationality
Let me close by returning to a question I raised in passing at the end of
Section 2. When we administer Thaler and Sunstein’s ‘as judged by them-
selves’ test, we envisage an idealised situation in which certain features of
the prospective nudgee’s cognition have been changed, and we ask them
whether they’d be glad of the nudge. In particular, in this idealised sit-
uation, we remove any irrational cognitive mechanisms at work in the
nudgee. This means that, to administer the test, we must know which
mechanisms count as irrational and which do not. But it seems like that,
just as economists, philosophers, and psychologists disagree over the bound-
aries of the rational, so might the nudger and the nudgee—indeed, either
nudger or nudgee might be an economist, philosopher, or psychologist. In
such cases, whose conception of rationality should we use? It’s even pos-
sible that your conception of rationality might change as a result of the
choice you make, and so your current self might disagree with your future
self about what counts as rational. Again: to which should we appeal when
we construct the idealised situation in which to run Thaler and Sunstein’s
test, or my revised version of it?
Suppose, for instance, that I discount my future retired self so heavily
that I am not now prepared to sacrifice even a modest extra amount of my
current income in order to better fund a pension scheme that will benefit
that future self considerably. You, a prospective government nudger, think
this level of discounting is irrational, whereas I think it’s rational. Would it
then be legitimate for you to nudge me into saving more for my pension?
Here’s one situation in which it would. Suppose I conceive of rational-
ity the way I do because of misleading evidence. Perhaps someone who
convinced me that they had read the relevant literature told me that it con-
cludes that this sort of discounting is rationally permissible, and I decide to
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defer to experts on this matter. And suppose further that, were I exposed to
the various arguments that theorists of rationality have actually made, I’d
conclude that it was in fact irrational. Then it seems that the nudge would
be legitimate, for in Thaler and Sunstein’s test, when we construct the ide-
alised situation, we provide the nudgee with all the relevant evidence, and
in this case doing that would lead me to change my mind about rationality,
and presumably I’d therefore come to favour saving more.
However, many cases that are not like that. Perhaps both nudger and
nudgee are theorists of rationality who are aware of all the existing argu-
ments, but simply disagree on the correct conclusion to draw from them.
In this case, I think the libertarian paternalist must respect the nudgee’s
account of rationality and refrain from nudging them. I think this follows
from the liberalism that underpins the means paternalism component of
nudge theory. Such liberalism seeks to preserve as much diversity of view-
point as possible, and it is reasonable to include accounts of rationality
among those viewpoints.
You might feel that there is a stronger case for nudging someone with
a different account of rationality from yours if you were to think that what
they count as rational and you count as irrational is not only irrational but
also, in some sense, immoral. After all, it’s a peculiar feature of conceiving
of the person you are as a collective of selves at different times that ques-
tions about how you should choose when your choice will affect future
selves seems, on the one hand, a question of prudential rationality, since
you are asking what will most likely lead to the best life for the person that
you are, but on the other hand, a question of morality, since you are asking
what will lead to the best outcomes for the different selves you will affect.
I think we see some of this dual aspect when we consider the pension case
or cases of unhealthy eating. When someone fails to save for their pension
or eats unhealthily, the reactions they receive are often closer to moral judg-
ments than to criticisms of prudential rationality. It is as if people criticise
the current self of the person who doesn’t save or who eats unhealthily on
the grounds that they are selfishness or show callous disregard for their
future selves, both of which are moral criticisms not prudential ones.
If we do consider failures to give due weight to our future selves to be
at least partially moral failings, or something akin to that, does that give
us greater reason to nudge someone away from acting on those weights?
I think not. Typically, nudge theorists do not advocate using nudges to
improve the moral behaviour of the nudgees. They don’t suggest nudg-
ing people to refrain from romantic infidelity, nor from lying to friends.
The reason is that there are certain aspects of morality that we take not to
fall under the purview of government. Which aspects we do consider as
falling under their purview changes from time to time and place to place,
of course, but there will nearly always be some immoral acts that the gov-
ernment has no remit to punish or prevent. If the cases of saving for the
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future and eating healthily do not fall under the government’s purview ex-
cept insofar as they are ends that the individuals already have, then there
is no reason to nudge individuals against the dictates of their faulty ac-
count of rationality. On the other hand, if we do consider those cases to
fall within the government’s remit, we should not use nudges to enforce
the prudentially rational or morally required choice, but rather legislation,
such as mandatory pension schemes or bans on certain unhealthy foods.
So, in the end, I think it will be rare that we should test for the legitimacy
of a nudge by constructing the idealised scenario in Thaler and Sunstein’s
test using the nudger’s conception of rationality, and not the nudgee’s.
10 Conclusion
In sum: I think it is sometimes legitimate for the government to nudge peo-
ple to make choices that they know will result in personally transformative
experiences and subsequent changes in values. But the bar the nudger must
clear is high. If the nudgee has already set the weights they apply to the
local utilities of their various selves both before and after the nudge, the
nudger must discover those and ensure that the nudgee would assent to
the nudge at both times based on the global utilities obtained from the local
utilities using those weights. And if the nudgee has not set those weights,
the nudger must have strong evidence that the nudgee would set them in
a way that would lead them to assent to the nudge both before and after-
wards. In both cases, the knowledge required is hard to come by.
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